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THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF ADVANCE MEDICAL 
DIRECTIVES
CAPTAIN THADDEUS A. HOFFMEISTER, USAR1
All of this turmoil—political, judicial and emotional—could
have been avoided or at least minimized if Terry Schiavo had left
a living will or advanced directive stating her wishes about
being kept alive, or not, on life support.2
I.  Introduction
While the litigation in the Terri Schiavo case is an extreme example
of what can go wrong in the health care decision-making process, it high-
1.  Presently serving as a legislative aide to Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton.
Previously served as a law clerk to the Honorable Anne E. Thompson, U.S. District Court,
District of New Jersey, 2002-2003.  Currently assigned to U.S. Army Japan, 9th TSC.
LL.M. 2002, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D. 1998, Northeastern University
School of Law; B.A. 1995, Morgan State University.  For a list of the author’s previous pub-
lications, see A Practitioner's Note on Physical Evaluation Boards, ARMY LAW., Feb. 2001,
at 49; Book review (author Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise), Gilbert Molleson Elliott:  A Life
Forged in the Crucible of the American Experience, FED. LAW., Feb. 2003, at 64; and On
the DMZ:  Move the Yanks from the Front, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 20, 2003, at A18.  The
author would like to thank the attorneys assigned to Walter Reed Army Medical Center
from 2000-2002 for reviewing this article.  
2.  Bee Editorial Staff, Editorial:  The Schiavo Intrusion, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 25,
2003, available at http://www.sacbee.com/content/opinion/story/7664430p-
8604453c.html.  Terri Schiavo, who is thirty-nine years old, has been in a persistent vege-
tative state since 1990 after she “suffered severe brain damage after a heart stoppage.”  Id.
Presently, she relies on a feeding tube and “can open her eyes and shows some facial
expressions but doctors say those movements are involuntary.”  Id.  For the past five years,
her husband, “Michael Schiavo, has sought to have her feeding tube removed so she can
die a natural death.  Her parents fought him in court, but through a five-year legal battle,
Florida courts consistently sided with her husband.” Id.; see, e.g., In re Schiavo, 800 So. 2d
640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist., 2001), review denied, In re Schindler, 816 So. 2d 127 (Fla.
2002), remanded by, In re Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist., 2003)
(holding that “the order of the guardianship court was affirmed. On remand, the guardian-
ship court was to schedule another hearing solely for the purpose of entering a new order
scheduling the removal of the nutrition and hydration tube”); rehearing denied, Schindler
v. Schiavo, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 14167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. July 9, 2003), review
denied, Schindler v. Schiavo, 855 So. 2d 621, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 1493 (Fla. 2003).  Terri’s
feeding tube was eventually removed in October 2003 for six days before the Florida leg-
islature and Governor Jeb Bush enacted a new law to have it reinserted.  Id.; see FLA. STAT.
tit. XXX, ch. 415, § 105 (2003); HB 35-E, 2003 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Fla. 2003) (granting the
governor “the authority to issue a one-time stay to prevent the withholding of nutrition and
hydration” providing certain criteria are met).
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lights the importance of advance medical directives (AMD) in helping to
ensure patient autonomy during end-of-life medical treatment.  Unfortu-
nately, large segments of society, to include the military, are still unclear
about the role of AMDs in patient care.3  Thus, this article provides a broad
overview of AMDs and their legal applications with a particular emphasis
on expanding their use in the military community.4   
II.  Overview
This article begins with a discussion of living wills and durable pow-
ers of attorney (DPOAs), demonstrating how each one individually and or
combined with the other form the component parts of an AMD.  The sec-
ond section of this article briefly explores the legal bases supporting
AMDs.  The third section provides a history of AMDs in the military fol-
lowed by recommendations on how to better implement and craft AMDs;
including proposed changes to the two Department of Defense (DOD)
3.  See Gina Kolata, Documents Like Living Wills Are Rarely of Aid, Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1997, at A12.  The reasons most frequently cited for the low percentage of
patients having AMDs are:
(1)  Most physicians and health care providers believe that the patient is
responsible for addressing the issue yet most patients perceive it as the
doctor’s responsibility;
(2)  Many physicians are uncomfortable discussing withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment;
(3)  Many young patients and their physicians believe that AMDs are
only necessary for the elderly or chronically ill patients.  This attitude is
repeatedly reinforced by numerous publications that only address AMDs
in the context of terminal illnesses; and
(4) Education efforts about AMDs have been ineffective, inadequate
and/or misdirected. 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, PATIENT SELF DETERMINATION ACT:  PROVIDERS OFFER
INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN, REPORT NO. GAO-95-
135 (Aug. 1995); Anita K. Gordon, Advance Directives Revisited:  A Proposal to Amend
Advance Directive Laws, 28 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 73, 86 (1995).
4.  For additional information regarding AMDs, see NANCY M. P. KING, MAKING SENSE
OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES (rev. ed. 1996); Alan Lieberson, Advance Medical Directives—
1998:  A Medical View, 12 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 305, (1998); U.S. ARMY MEDICAL COM-
MAND, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, 1999 MEDICAL-LEGAL DESKBOOK 1-1 (Aug.
1999) [hereinafter MEDICAL LEGAL DESKBOOK, AMD]. 
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Directives that address AMDs.5  The article concludes with a model
AMD.6
III.  Component Parts
Generally speaking, an AMD is a written statement recognized under
state law7 intended to govern the health care8 decisions of the patient,
should he or she9 lose decision-making capacity in the future.  Although
AMDs offer patients a measure of autonomy, they are by no means a pan-
acea for those contemplating medical treatment decisions.10  Advance
medical directives can take the following three forms:  a living will,
DPOA, or combination thereof.11
Any adult12 who has decision-making capacity13 can make an AMD.
All states and the District of Columbia have some type of documentary
mechanism known collectively as an AMD.14  Historically, most viewed
AMDs as a way to refuse treatment in cases of terminal illness.15   Now,
5.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 1350.4, LEGAL ASSISTANCE MATTERS (28 Apr.
2001) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 1350.4]; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 6000.14, PATIENT BILL
OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE MILITARY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (1998) (addressing the
duty of the health care provider to discuss AMDs with the patient).
6.  This AMD is based on the one currently in use at Walter Reed Army Medical
Center.  On 1 October 2000, Drafting Libraries (DL) Wills became the Army Standard
Software for drafting estate-planning documents.  Lieutenant Colonel Curtis A. Parker,
Deputy Chief, Legal Assistance Policy Division, OTJAG (14 Sept. 2000).  The DL Wills
users may prepare state-specific living wills and advance medical directives.  Presently,
“DL Wills Software is available without charge to all Army Legal Assistance (LA) provid-
ers (active and reserve components) including those outside of LA who have a LA-related
mission to prepare important estate planning documents (e.g., wills, advance medical
directives).”  Information Paper, Miles Smutz, Development Project Services, subject:
Downloading & Registering Drafting Libraries (DL) Wills Software via JAGCNET (24
Jan. 2002).
7.  T.P. Gallanis, Write and Wrong:  Rethinking the Way We Communicate Health
Care Decisions, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1015, 1025-1026 (1999).
8.  This includes mental health care.  Currently, five states have statutes recognizing
mental health AMDs.  Lieberson, supra note 4, at 312; see also Roberto Cuca, Ulysses in
Minnesota:  First Steps Toward a Self-Binding Psychiatric Advance Medical Directive Stat-
ute, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1152 n.146 (1993); Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Instruments
for Mental Health Treatment: Advance Directives for Psychiatric Care:  A Theoretical and
Practical Overview for Legal Professionals, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 746 (1998).
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however, many view an AMD as a tool to allow incapacitated patients the
possibility of dignity and control at the end of life.16
A.  Living Will
The first component of an AMD is the living will or instructive direc-
tive.17  The living will is a written document informing health care provid-
ers about particular types of medical care the patient wants provided or
withheld.  First introduced in 1969 by attorney Luis Kutner, the living will
was an early attempt to grant the patient increased treatment autonomy.18
Mr. Kutner argued that, although the common law prohibited euthanasia,
patients could withhold their consent to necessary future medical treat-
ment.19  Mr. Kutner proposed that the law permits competent patients to
9.  Thirty-four states include pregnancy exemptions in their AMD statutes.  Of the
thirty-four states, seventeen automatically disregard the AMD throughout the entire preg-
nancy, while many of the remaining seventeen offers lesser forms of restrictions.  It is the
author’s opinion that pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, an AMD created under 10 U.S.C.
§ 1044 (2000) would override any state statute, which prohibited the enforcement of a mil-
itary AMD because the declarant was pregnant.  See Supremacy Clause, (“Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . .”).  For a more complete discussion
on AMD pregnancy statutes, see Timothy J. Burch, Incubator or Individual?:  The Legal
Policy Deficiencies of Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health Care Direc-
tive Statutes, 54 MD. L. REV. 528 (1995); Amy Lynn Jerdee, Breaking Through the Silence:
Minnesota’s Pregnancy Presumption and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 971 (2000); Anne D. Lederman, A Womb of My Own:  A Moral Evaluation of Ohio’s
Treatment of Pregnant Patients with Living Wills, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 351 (1994); Jan-
ice MacAvoy-Snitzer, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1280
(1987).
10.  See Vicki Joiner Bowers, Elder Law Symposium:  Comment:  Advance Direc-
tives:  Peace of Mind or False Security, 26 STETSON L. REV. 677 (1996); Rebecca Dresser,
Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 425, 431 (1990) (discussing some of the limits
of AMDs); Gordon, supra note 3, at 85; Lieberson, supra note 4; Jon L. Spargur, Jr., Are
Living Wills Dead in North Carolina?, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591 (1997); Joan M. Tenno
et al., Do Advance Directives Provide Instructions That Direct Care?,  45 J. AM. GERIATRICS
SOC’Y 508 (1997).
11.  Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaptation of Miranda to Advance Directives:
A Critique of the Implementation of the Patient Self Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX
139, 149 (1999).
12.  See Jennifer Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy:  Should Minors Have a
Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life Sustaining Treatment, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1996)
(discussing the rights of minors and AMDs).
13.  AR 40-3, infra note 77, sec. II, Terms (“A patient with decision-making capacity
is an adult who has the ability to communicate and understand information and the ability
to reason and deliberate sufficiently well about the choices involved.”). 
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execute documents explaining their future health care wishes.20  Over the
past thirty years, Kutner’s idea has evolved into a document widely
14.  See T.P. Gallanis, Write and Wrong:  Rethinking the Way We Communicate
Health Care Decisions, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1015, 1028 (1999) (citing ALA. CODE § 22-8A-
5(a)(2) (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.020 (Michie 1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3202
(1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-204(a) (Michie 1997); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
7188 (Deering 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-579a
(1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2504(a)(1) (1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2424(2) (1997);
FLA. STAT. ch. 765.104(1)(a) (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5(a)(2) (1997); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 327D-12(2) (1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-4506(1)(b) (1997); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/
5(a)(2) (West 1997); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-12(a)(1) (1998); IOWA CODE § 144A.4(1) (1997);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,105(a)(2) (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.627(1)(a) (Michie
1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.4(A)(2)(a) (West 1998); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
201D, §5 (1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-803(b) (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-604 (1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.496(11)(d) (1997); MINN. STAT. §
145B.09(1) (1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-109(1) (1997); MO. REV. STAT. § 459.020(1)
(1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-104(1) (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-406(1) (1997); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 449.620(1) (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:7(1)(c) (1997); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:2H-57(b) (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-3(B) (Michie 1997); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 2969(1), 2985(1)(a) (McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(e)
(1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-05(1)(a) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.04
(Anderson 1998); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.6(A) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.545(1)(b)
(1997); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5406 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23.4.11-4(a)(1) (1997); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-77-80(2) (Law. Co-op. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-8 (Michie
1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-106(1) (1997); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
672.012(2) (West 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1111(1)(b) (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2985(i) (Michie 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5257 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE §
70.122.040(1)(b) (1997); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4(a)(2) (1997); WIS. STAT. § 154.05(1)(b)
(1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-103(a)(ii) (Michie 1997)).  For an overview of select stat-
utes, see Bretton J. Horttor, A Survey of Living Will and Advance Health Care Directives,
74 N.D. L. REV. 233 (1998) (discussing selected state statutes).
15.  DAVID JOHN DOUKAS & WILLIAM REICHEL, PLANNING FOR UNCERTAINTY:  A GUIDE
TO LIVING WILLS AND OTHER ADVANCE DIRECTIVES FOR HEALTH CARE 53 (1993).  The use of
the “right-to-die” label and its association with death may explain why the general public
has not used AMDs more widely.  Perhaps more people would have signed AMDs if they
were associated with the right to choose medical treatment, rather than the right to die.  
16.  KING, supra note 4, at 2.  Even though AMDs embody a broad range of possible
medical treatment areas, most are written for the refusal of life-sustaining treatment.  Id.
17.  See Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws:  A Necessary Supplement to
Living Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REV. 103 (1993).  “Living will”
is the term generally used by the public although only a few statutes use the term.  See, e.g.,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(4) (Supp. 1992) (defining “living will” as a “written decla-
ration” of a person's preferences for medical treatment).  Most statutes use the terms “dec-
laration” or “directive” to describe a living will.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1990)
(defining declaration as a written document directing “withdrawal of life-sustaining proce-
dures in a terminal condition”); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610 (1990) (defining directive as writ-
ten document expressing individual's wish to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
procedures). 
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accepted and recognized in all fifty states to include the District of Colum-
bia—the living will.21  This is not to say, however, that living wills are as
well known by the average individual, as they should be.22  Even today,
many people are still unfamiliar with living wills and even mistakenly
refer to them as testamentary wills.23
Procedurally speaking, living wills become effective when (1) the
declarant (patient)24 is no longer capable of making medical care deci-
sions; (2) the declarant is in a condition covered by the living will; and (3)
a decision covered by the living will is called for.25  The principal advan-
tage of the living will is the unparalleled capacity to memorialize the sub-
jective intent of the declarant.26  Also, the living will avoids potential
conflicts27 of interest that may arise in the case of substitute decision-mak-
ers and removes a huge burden from those same decision-makers who are
normally a relative or close family friend.28  The obvious inherent weak-
ness of the living will is its inability to cover every potential contingency.
Yet, even if one could draft a living will in such a way as to cover every
unforeseen event, such broad coverage would render it impotent, as the
18.  Luis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia:  The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND.
L.J. 539 (1968-1969); Luis Kutner, The Living Will:  Coping with the Historical Event of
Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 39 (1975).  Mr. Kutner had formulated this concept years earlier
during the 1950s while working with the Euthanasia Society.  Horttor, supra note 14, at 233.
19.  Id.
20.  Id.
21.  Gallanis, supra note 14 at 1028.
22.  Kolata, supra note 3, at A12.
23.  While these two legal documents share a similar purpose, that is, both attempts
to speak after their maker is unable to do so, they are entirely different instruments.  Testa-
mentary wills dispose of property at death.  Living wills direct medical treatment.  The liv-
ing will, unlike the testamentary will, is not governed by the law of the maker’s domicile
but by the law of the state where the AMD is exercised.  See Leslie Francis, The Evanes-
cence of Living Wills, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 141 (1989) (comparing AMDs and tes-
tamentary wills); Therese A. Bruno, The Deployment Will, 47 A.F. L. REV. 211 (1999)
(discussing testamentary wills in the military).
24.  For the purposes of this article “declarant” and “patient” are used interchange-
ably as are “agent” and “proxy.”
25.  KING, supra note 4, at 126-127.
26.  Gallagher, supra note 8, at 750. 
27.  See generally Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001); Lynda M. Taran-
tino, Withdrawal of Life Support:  Conflict Among Patient Wishes, Family, Physicians,
Courts and Statutes, and the Law, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 623 (1994) (discussing such conflicts);
Katy Hillenmeyer, End-of-Life Care A Dilemma; Families, Patients Wrestle With Medical
Advances, Hard Choices, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Sept. 5, 2000, at A1, n.2.
28.  Lieberson, supra note 4, at 328.
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numerous contingencies would drown out the specific intent of the
declarant.29
B.  Durable Power of Attorney30
The second component part of the AMD is the DPOA31 or “health
care power of attorney.”  Durable powers of attorney trace their roots back
to agency law, which allows “a person [principal] to do through an agent
whatever he is empowered to do for his own person.”32  Unlike regular
powers of attorney, however, incapacity of the principal does not extin-
guish a DPOA.33  To the contrary, the principal creates a DPOA with the
intent that he will soon become incapacitated and unable to make deci-
sions.34  Because DPOAs survive incapacity, revocation becomes of prime
importance.  Fortunately, the common-law rule of agency—that a principal
may revoke the authority of the agent at will35—applies to the DPOA.36
Procedurally speaking, the DPOA comes in two different forms,
“springing” and “current.”37  A “springing” DPOA is effective only when
a specific event occurs, such as incapacity of the principal.38  A “current”
DPOA is effective upon execution of the document.  Of the two, the
“springing” DPOA is more burdensome to use when creating an AMD, as
the third party, the health care provider, may not be convinced that the
29.  Gallagher, supra note 8, at 750.
30.  The following phrases are examples of language used in DPOAs:  “This power
of attorney shall not be affected by subsequent disability or incapacity of the principal” or
“This power of attorney shall become effective upon the disability or incapacity of the prin-
cipal.”  UNIFORM PROB. CODE § 5-501, 8 U.L.A 513 (1989); UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATT’Y
ACT § 1, 8A U.L.A. 278 (1987).
31.  See generally Mark Fowler, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment
Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985, 1008-20 (1984). 
32.  First Nat’l Bank of Alex. v. Southland Prod. Co., 112 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Okla.
1941).
33.  Major Michael N. Schmitt & Captain Steven A. Hatfield, Durable Power of
Attorney:  Applications and Limitations, 132 MIL. L. REV. 203, 205 (1991).
34.  Jill Hollander, Health Care Proxies:  New York’s Attempt to Resolve the Right to
Die Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 145, 148-149 (1991).
35.  This may not be true for mental health AMDs.  See Roberto Cuca, Ulysses in
Minnesota:  First Steps Toward a Self-Binding Psychiatric Advance Medical Directive Stat-
ute, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1152, 1153 (1993).
36.  Schmitt & Hatfield, supra note 33, at 203.
37.  Faculty, The Judge Advocate General’s School, TJAGSA Practice Note:  Estate
Planning Note, ARMY LAW., Nov. 2000, at 38.
38.  Id.
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“springing” condition triggering the DPOA has actually occurred.39  Also,
as with regular powers of attorney, a third party generally is not obligated
to honor the DPOA.40
For most, the advantages of the DPOA over the living will are obvi-
ous.41  Living wills always need interpretation and, regardless of skillful
craftsmanship, cannot cover all healthcare contingencies.  The agent or
proxy in a DPOA, however, knows the patient’s values intimately and can
respond to unexpected events.42  In addition, the agent can ask questions,
assess risks and costs, speak to relatives and friends of the patient, consider
a variety of therapeutic options, seek the opinions of other physicians, and
evaluate the patient’s condition and prospects of recovery; in short, engage
in the same complex decision-making process that the patient would
undertake if able to do so.43  The DPOA, however, is not without its faults.
For example, many patients do not want to burden their relatives or close
friends with the job of proxy thereby requiring them to make the “tough
choices.”44  In addition, there is no guarantee that the proxy will be able to
carry out the patient’s desired intent or that the proxy will be in a rational
state when forced to make a decision.45   
C.  The Hybrid
The hybrid, which has become the standard format46 for most AMDs
to include those used in the military, employs a living will and a DPOA.
Several reasons exist as to why one should have both a living will and a
DPOA.47  First, proxy decision makers do not want the full responsibility
of making life-altering decisions without some form of guidance.48  A liv-
ing will provides a framework within which the proxy can make his or her
39.  Captain Kent R. Meyer, Continuing Powers of Attorney, 112 MIL. L. REV. 257
(1986).  The model military AMD offered at the end of this article offers both a current and
springing POA.
40.  Schmitt & Hatfield, supra note 33, at 211.  However, see infra note 55.
41.  David A. Peters, Advance Medical Directives:  The Case for the Durable Power
of Attorney for Health Care, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 437 (1987).
42.  See Lieutenant Colonel William A. Woodruff, Letting Life Run Its Course:  Do
Not-Resuscitate Orders and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment, ARMY LAW., Apr.
1989, at 13 (providing information on selecting an agent or proxy).
43.  Fowler, supra note 31, at 1001.
44.  Id.
45.  Lieberson, supra note 4, at 327.
46.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (1998).
47.  Pope, supra note 11, at 183-184.
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decisions.49  Second, a health care provider is more likely to follow a
hybrid as it increases the chances that the patient and his proxy have dis-
cussed in-depth the patient’s healthcare wishes.50  The hybrid, however,
like any legal instrument, is not without its complications.  For example, if
a patient has both a living will51 and a DPOA,52 some states have created
a pecking order53 between the two, while other states have mandated that
the last instrument executed is controlling.54
D. AMDs and Liability55
All state living will and DPOA statutes confer some type of immunity
from civil and or criminal liability on health care providers who in good
faith comply with a properly executed AMD in accordance with the
patient’s wishes or in the patient’s best interest.56  Conversely, only a small
number of states provide enforcement provisions against health care pro-
viders who fail to follow an AMD.57  Those states recognizing enforce-
ment provisions place them in three broad categories:  professional
sanctions, civil liability, and criminal charges.58  While the potential exists
for a patient or his estate to pursue one or all of these actions, they rarely
48.  Steven R. Stieber, Right to Die:  Public Balks at Deciding for Others, HOSPS. 72
(Mar. 5, 1982) (stating that only forty-six percent of Americans would be willing to discon-
nect life-support).
49.  Pope, supra note 47, at 183.
50.  Lieberson, supra note 4, at 329.
51.  Id.  The living will is controlling in Connecticut, Hawaii, Ohio and Arizona.  
52.  Id.  The DPOA is controlling in Georgia, New Hampshire and Utah. 
53.  The model AMD offered at the end of this article demonstrates how to avoid a
potential conflict between the DPOA and living will.
54.  Id. (including Texas, Rhode Island, North Dakota, and South Dakota).  
55.  See generally M. Rose Gasner, Financial Penalties for Failing to Honor Patient
Wishes to Refuse Treatment, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 499 (1992); Adam A. Milani, Bet-
ter off Dead than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a “Wrongful Living” Cause of
Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patient’s Advance Directives, 54 WASH & LEE L. REV.
149 (1997); Philip G. Peters, The Illusion of Autonomy at the End of Life:  Unconsented Life
Support and the Wrongful Life Analogy, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 673 (1998); Maggie J. Randall
Robb, Living Wills:  The Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical Treatment A Right Without
a Remedy, 23 DAYTON L. REV. 169 (1997); Mark Strasser, A Jurisprudence in Disarray:  On
Battery, Wrongful Living, and the Right to Bodily Integrity, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 997
(1999); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Where There Is a
Right, There Ought To Be A Remedy, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 649 (1998).
56.  Wilborn, supra note 55, at 658 n.47. 
57.  Robb, supra note 55, at 173.
58.  Id.
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do.59   This potential is even more remote in the military as many patients
are prevented from bringing legal action against the federal government
pursuant to the Feres60 doctrine, and those who are not must follow the
restrictive requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act.61  Both military
and non-military patients, however, should be aware that, while states have
attempted to limit the liability of both hospitals and health care providers,
the potential for provider liability still exists.62
IV.  Legal Bases for Recognizing AMDs
While AMDs are relatively new, the legal framework supporting
them has been around for over a hundred years.63  The legal basis for rec-
ognizing AMDs rests with the patient’s right of autonomy and self-deter-
mination regarding medical treatment.64  This right can be found in both
the common law65 and the U.S. Constitution.66  At common law,67 the
touching of one person by another—regardless of whether committed by a
health care provider—without consent or legal justification constitutes an
assault.68  The natural corollary of the common law consent doctrine is the
right not to consent; that is, the right to refuse medical treatment.69  
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision,70 found the right to refuse medical treatment con-
stitutionally protected.71  The Court, while acknowledging that some states
59.  Id.
60.  Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
61.  28 U.S.C. 1346 (2000). 
62.  Gragg v. Calandra, 297 Ill. App. 3d 639 (Ill. 1998); see also Osgood v. Genesys
Reg. Med. Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH (Genesee County Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 16, 1996) (award-
ing $16.6 million to a plaintiff after her husband was provided life support against his will).
63.  See Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
64.  Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health Dir., 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
65.  Id.   
66.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
67.  Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914).  Justice
Cardozo stated, “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient’s consent commits an assault; for which he is liable in damages.”  Id.
68.  See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON LAW OF
TORTS § 9, at 39-42 (5th ed. 1984).  Obtaining consent is not always required when treating
service members.  U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY para. 5-4 (15
July 1999) [hereinafter AR 600-20]. 
69.  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
70.  Id.
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reviewed this right pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s “right to pri-
vacy,”72 held that “this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interest.”73  Also, the Supreme Court made it
patently clear that AMDs are “a valuable additional safeguard of the
patient’s interest in directing his medical care.”74
Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA)75
In addition to the Cruzan decision, passage of the PSDA in 1991 fur-
ther enhanced the legal recognition and use of AMDs.  This act required
hospitals receiving Medicare and Medicaid monies to inform their patients
about relevant state laws regarding AMDs.76  While the PSDA is not appli-
cable to military medical treatment facilities, both military and Joint Com-
mission on Health Care Organization (JCAHO) regulations mandate that
military treatment facilities follow similar standards.77  The PSDA signi-
fied the first major federal legislation concerning the use of AMDs and was
ushered through Congress to help reduce the number of difficult ethical
and legal issues presented during medical treatment decisions.78  The ulti-
71.  Id. at 279.
72.  Prior to Cruzan, several state courts viewed the right to refuse medical treatment
as a Fourteenth Amendment fundamental Right to Privacy issue.  See, e.g., In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
73.  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.  Applying a “liberty interest” results in somewhat less
protection for the individual.  By analyzing this issue pursuant to a “liberty interest,” the
Court must balance the individual’s “liberty interest” against the relevant state interest to
determine if a constitutional infringement has occurred.  If the Court, however, had ana-
lyzed this issue within a “Right to Privacy” framework, the state would have had to dem-
onstrate a compelling state interest prior to infringing upon the individual’s rights.  Id.
74.  Id.
75.  Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives:  A His-
tory and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 249
(1997).  
76.  42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1) (A)(ii) (2000).
77.  U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 40-3, MEDICAL, DENTAL AND VETERINARY CARE para. 2-
1 (11 Dec. 2002); U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 51-504, LEGAL ASSISTANCE, NOTARY, AND
PREVENTIVE LAW PROGRAMS para. 1.3.1 (1 May 1996) [hereinafter AFI 51-504]; U.S DEP’T
OF NAVY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL INSTR. (JAGINST) 5801-2 (11 Apr. 97) [hereinafter
JAGINST 5801-2]; U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., U.S. COAST GUARD, COMMANDANT INSTR.
5801.4C, LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (30 July 99) [hereinafter COAST GUARD, COMMANDANT
INSTR. 5801.4C]. 
78.  The Patient Self-Determination Act:  Health Care’s Own Miranda, 8 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455 (1992) (Commentary by Senator William V. Roth Jr.) (citing 136
CONG. REC. E2, 190 (June 28, 1990)) (statement of Representative, now Senator, Levin).  
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mate goal of the PSDA was to heighten public awareness of AMDs and
empower the patient in making health care decisions.79
V.  Part III:  Evolution of AMDs in the Military
In the military, AMDs followed a similar pattern of acceptance and
use as in the civilian community.  Initially, in 1978, Army policy did not
allow either DNRs80 or withdrawal-of-life-support orders.81  This policy
remained in effect until 1985, when subsequent to the publication of the
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical Research,82 the Army formally started to recognize DNR
Orders.83  Prior to 1985, many military medical treatment facilities like
civilian hospitals found themselves creating “slow codes” or “notify MOD
[medical officer of the day] before coding” instructions.84  Medical staff,
patients and patient’s families at military medical treatment facilities used
these informal agreements to get around the prohibition against with-
drawal of life support and DNR orders.85  By 1990, after much staffing, the
79.  Id.  
80.  Do not resuscitate (DNR) orders are technically, but not legally, a type of AMD.
Do not resuscitate orders are medical orders left on the patient’s chart by an attending phy-
sician instructing other health care providers not to order therapy collectively referred to as
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation.  COMMITTEE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, APPROACHING
DEATH:  IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INST. OF MED. 98-99 (1997).  
81.  Woodruff, supra note 42, at 7-8.
82.  Id. at 8 (citing President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med-
icine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treat-
ment:  Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 248-55 (1983)).
83.  The Army, however, did not rescind its prohibition against the withdrawal of life
support until the decision in Tune v. Walter Reed Army Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1453,
(D.D.C 1985).  An earlier case regarding the withdrawal of care at a military treatment
facility, Newman v. United States, No. EP-86-CA-276 LEXIS (W.D. Tex. 1986), was dis-
missed as the patient died before adjudication.
84.  Woodruff, supra note 42, at 8.
85.  Id.  These informal arrangements were necessary because the Judge Advocate
General at the time determined that “it was at least possible that a physician withdrawing
life support or failing to order resuscitation could face criminal prosecution in some circum-
stances.”  Id.
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Army finally permitted living wills in the inpatient and outpatient records
of its patients.86  
A.  Growing Pains
As AMDs continued to gain acceptance and popularity after the Cru-
zan decision and the passage of the PSDA,87 the Army began to include
AMD implementation guidelines in its regulations.88   Judge advocates
tasked with advising personnel about AMDs quickly realized that, due to
the transient lifestyle of military personnel, a strong possibility existed that
some states would not recognize AMDs created for service members in
other states.89  Soldiers could not be sure if an AMD created pursuant to
the local state requirements would be valid in another state that had differ-
ent standards.90  Fortunately, 10 U.S.C. § 1044c removed this uncer-
tainty.91
B.  10 U.S.C. § 1044c
This statute exempts “an advance medical directive executed by a
person eligible for legal assistance . . . from any requirement of form, sub-
stance, formality, or recording.”92  The statute permits federal recognition
of AMDs created for individuals eligible for military legal assistance.
Therefore, if an AMD is created at Fort Bragg, it is valid in every state rec-
ognizing AMDs regardless of that state’s particular procedural require-
ments.93  This legislation is significant for several reasons.  First, the need
for judge advocates to be familiar with AMD laws of other states is greatly
86.  Major Stephen M. Parke, Death and Dying in Army Hospitals:  The Past and
Future Roles of Advance Medical Directives, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1994, at 6.  Memorandum,
to Commanders, U.S. Army Health Services Command, subject:  Placement of Living
Wills in Outpatient Treatment Records, and In Patient Records 3 (9 Nov. 1990).
87.  Michael A. Salatka, Commentaries:  The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990,
1 J. PHARMACY & L. 155, 156 (1992). 
88.  Currently, all four services plus the Coast Guard offer military AMDs.  AR 40-
3, supra note 77, para. 2-1; AFI 51-504, supra note 77, para. 1.3.1; JAGINST 5801-2, supra
note 77; U.S. COAST GUARD, COMMANDANT INSTR. 5801.4C, supra note 77.  In addition, some
local military medical treatment facilities have their own implementation regulations, U.S.
DEP’T OF ARMY, WALTER REED ARMY MED. CENTER REG. 40-8, IMPLEMENTATION OF ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES (2 Apr. 99) [WALTER REED ARMY MED. CENTER REG. 40-8].
89.  Colonel Alfred R. Arquilla et al., Army Legal Assistance:  Update, Initiatives,
and Future Challenges, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1995, at 14-15.  
90.  Parke, supra note 86, at 9.
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diminished.94  Second, Congress did not mandate a required AMD format,
thus giving drafters wide-latitude in deciding what language to include in
the AMD.95   Third, the statute did not require an attorney (military or civil-
91.  Arquilla, supra note 89, at 14-15.  Lieutenant Colonel George L., Hancock, Jr.
then the Chief, Administrative and Civil Law Division, The Judge Advocate General’s
School, U.S. Army, first proposed the concept and initial draft for this legislation.  The law
is as follows: 
(a) Instruments To Be Given Legal Effect Without Regard to State Law.
An advance medical directive executed by a person eligible for legal
assistance—
(1) is exempt from any requirement of form, substance formality, or
recording that is provided for advance medical directives under the laws
of a State; and 
(2) shall be given the same legal effect as an advance medical directive
prepared and executed in accordance with the laws of the State con-
cerned.
(b) Advance Medical Directives.  For purposes of this section, an
advance medical directive is any written declaration that-
(1) sets forth directions regarding the provision, withdrawal, or with-
holding of life-prolonging procedures, including hydration and suste-
nance, for the declarant whenever the declarant has a terminal physical
condition or is in a vegetative state; or
(2) authorizes another person to make health care decisions for the
declarant, under circumstances stated in the declaration, whenever the
declarant is incapable of making informed health care decisions.
(c)  Statement To Be Included. 
(1) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, an
advance medical directive prepared by an attorney authorized to provide
legal assistance shall contain a statement that sets forth the provisions of
subsection (a).
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not construed to make inapplicable the provi-
sions of subsection (a) to an advance medical directive in a State that
does not otherwise recognize and enforce advance medical directives
under the laws of the State.
(d) Definitions.  In this section:
(1) The term “State” includes the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, and a possession of the United States.
(2)  The term “person eligible for legal assistance: means a person who
is eligible for legal assistance under section 1044 of this title.
(3) The term “legal assistance” means legal services authorized under
section 1044 of this title.
10 U.S.C. § 1044c (2000).
92.   Id.
93.  Currently, all fifty states and Washington, D.C. recognize some form of an AMD.
See supra note 14.  
94.  MEDICAL LEGAL DESKBOOK, AMD, supra note 4, at 1-7.
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ian) to draft the AMD, thereby making the AMD more easily accessible to
those who need it.96
VI.  Part IV:  Current Status and Recommendations
A. DOD Directive 1350.4
Unfortunately, some individuals, to include attorneys, may mistak-
enly believe that an AMD created pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1044c is only
effective in the state in which it was created or that an attorney must draft
it for it to be valid.  While the former issue is solved by increased publica-
tion and discussion of 10 U.S.C. § 1044c, the latter requires an alteration
to DOD Directive 1350.4.  The Directive states in para. 4.2.2, “A military
testamentary   instrument shall:  Be executed in the presence of a military
legal assistance counsel acting as presiding attorney,” and goes on in para.
4.4. to state, “If prepared, such documents will include a statement or pre-
amble in form and content substantially as outlined at enclosure 4,” which
reads as follows:
This is a military advance medical directive prepared pursuant to
section 1044c of title 10, United States Code.  It was prepared by
an attorney authorized to provide legal assistance for an individ-
ual eligible to receive legal assistance under section 1044 of title
10, United States Code.  Federal law exempts this advance med-
ical directive from any requirement of form, substance, formality
or recording that is provided for advance medical directive under
the laws of a State.  Federal law specifies that this advance med-
ical directive shall be given the same legal effect as an advance
medical directive prepared and executed in accordance with the
laws of the State concerned.97
The directive as currently written improperly interprets 10 U.S.C. §
1044c.98  The DOD should modify the Directive99 by removing both para
95.  Arquilla, supra note 89, at 14-15. 
96.  Id.  
97.  See DOD DIR. 1350.4, supra note 5, at 9 (emphasis added).
98.  Arquilla et al., supra note 89, at 14-15.  
99.  This modification would allow the Directive to reflect the recommendations
originally offered by Parke, supra note 86, app. B.
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4.2.2 (“Be executed in the presence of at military legal assistance counsel
as presiding attorney”) and the italicized language listed above.100
To receive the protections of 10 U.S.C. §1044c, an attorney need not
draft the declarant’s AMD.  Instead, the declarant need only be eligible for
military legal assistance.101  The significant point is not “by whom” the
AMD is prepared but “for whom” it is prepared.102  In the opinion of this
author, such additional formalities imposed by DOD Directive 1350.4 are
contrary to the purpose of both the PSDA and 10 U.S.C. § 1044c.   Man-
dating that only attorneys draft AMDs both overstates the importance of
attorneys103 in the AMD process and creates unnecessary impediments not
generally found in the civilian community.104  Notwithstanding the fact
that AMDs can be drafted without assistance from counsel, judge advo-
cates need to stay current with AMD developments and be available to
those who need or want additional information or assistance in completing
them.  Also, judge advocates should be proactive in educating the military
community about the benefits of AMDs by offering timely information
papers, presentations and other educational materials.
B. Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP)105
Besides modifying DOD Directive 1350.4, the military should take
steps to offer AMDs to its personnel prior to hospitalization, ideally during
initial in-processing or mobilization briefings.  Currently, military regula-
tions require hospital personnel to brief service members on AMDs upon
100.  See DOD DIR. 1350.4, supra note 5, para. 3.4, 4.2.2.
101.  10 U.S.C. § 1044c (2000). 
102.  Arquilla et al., supra note 89, at 14-15.
103.  John F. Fader, Trends in Health Care Decisionmaking:  The Precarious Role of
the Courts: Surrogate Health Care Decisionmaking, 53 MD. L. REV. 1193 (1994).  Judge
Fader argues that permitting non-attorneys to draft AMDs “will help keep life and death
medical decisions out of the courtrooms and will allow more of these decisions to remain
with the individual patient and his family and friends, where they belong.”  Id. at 1219.
104.  Many non-profit organizations have created a universal AMD valid in most
states.  “Each state has an approved living will document that has an approved living will
document that is downloadable and free on the website of the not-for profit partnership-
forcaring.org.”  Jean Chatzky, A Will For the Living, TIME MAG., Nov. 3, 2003, at 18.
105.  U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8-101, PERSONNEL PROCESSING (IN-AND OUT AND
MOBILIZATION PROCESSING) (1 Mar. 1997).  The SRPs serve to prepare soldiers for deploy-
ment by updating their medical and dental records, life insurance policies, identification
cards, family care plans, testamentary wills and power of attorneys.  Generally speaking,
units conduct bi-annual SRPs.
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admission to a medical treatment facility.106  Studies demonstrate that this
is normally not the best time for patients to start thinking about AMDs.107
Providing AMDs prior to hospitalization108 allows service members more
time to contemplate the AMD without the immediacy of pain, discomfort,
fears or the press of time.109  In addition, prior to hospitalization, the ser-
vice member has more time to seek further counsel from friends, family,
counsel, clergy or other health care providers.
The SRP is just one example of an opportunity the Army has to
expose a captive audience to the benefits of an AMD.  While commanders
cannot require personnel to complete an AMD, they can at least ensure that
the service member is educated about its opportunities.  Through the SRP,
the Army can encourage service members to plan for future medical treat-
ment or at least to start thinking about it.  In fact, the DOD policy man-
dates, “Although not every person needs a will or military testamentary
instrument, all military personnel shall consider the advisability of making
either.”110
VII.  Conclusion
While no amount of prior planning or documentation exists to ensure
patient treatment autonomy when a person is incapacitated, AMDs help
ensure that the patient’s desires are followed.  The recommendations pro-
vided in this article will, if implemented, ensure that service members are
offered greater opportunities to complete or at least become aware of
AMDs, and thus become more active participants in their own medical
care treatment. 
106.  Parke, supra note 86 at 7; see also Captain Michael J. Roy & Itzhak Jacoby, The
Patient Self-Determination Act:  Is It All It Can Be?, 158 MIL. MED. 1128-1129 (1993).   In
addition, some local military medical treatment facilities have their own implementation
regulations, WALTER REED ARMY MED. CENTER REG. 40-8, supra note 77, at Sec. 5a.
107.  Pope, supra note 11, at 141.
108.  Parke, supra note 86 at 10.
109.  The American Medical Association does not believe that the hospital is the most
appropriate place, nor admission to a facility the most appropriate time, for a patient to con-
sider the issues of an AMD.  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Medicare and Long-Term
Care Senate Committee on Finance, 101st Cong. 1-3 (1990) (statement of Nancy W.
Dickey, M.D. Board of Trustees, American Medical Association); Parke, supra note 86, at
10.
110.  DOD DIR. 1350.4, supra note 5, para. 4.1.1.
2003] ADVANCE MEDICAL DIRECTIVES 127
Appendix A
Proposed Model Advance Medical Directive
This is a military advance medical directive prepared pursuant to section
1044c of title 10, United States Code.  Federal law exempts this advance medical
directive from any requirement of form, substance, formality or recording that is
provided for an advance medical directive under the laws of a State.  Federal law
specifies that this advance medical directive shall be given the same legal effect
as an advance medical directive prepared and executed in accordance with the
laws of the State concerned.  This military advance medical directive consists of
five sections: (I) Durable Power of Attorney; (II) Living Will; (III) Other Wishes;
(IV) Signatures; and (V) Revocation.
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Part I.  Durable Power of Attorney
A Durable Power of Attorney authorizes your agent broad discretion regard-
ing your medical treatment.  You should speak with an attorney if you wish to limit
this authorization.  Choose someone who knows you very well, cares about you,
and who can make difficult decisions. 
____I designate the following individual to act as my agent to make health
care decisions for me when I cannot make those decisions myself___ or starting











___I have not appointed anyone to make health care decisions for me in this
or any other document.
Page 1 of 5
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Part II.  Living Will
A Living Will is used to determine what medical treatment you would or
would not want in the event that you are unable to make decisions for yourself.
 ____I do not want life-sustaining treatments started.  If life-sustaining treat-
ments are started I want them stopped.
____I want life-sustaining treatments that my health care providers think are
best for me.
___Additional information _____________________________________
1.  Comfort Care
___I want to be as comfortable and free of pain as possible, even if such care
prolongs or shortens my life.
___Additional Information:_____________________________________
2.  Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
___I do not want artificial nutrition and hydration started if it would be the
main treatment keeping me alive.  If artificial nutrition and hydration are started,
I want them stopped.
___I want artificial nutrition and hydration even if it is the main treatment
keeping me alive.
___Additional information:_____________________________________
3.  These are my desires if I am ever in a persistent vegetative state:
___I do not want life-sustaining treatments started.  If life-sustaining treat-
ments are started, I want them stopped.
___I want life-sustaining treatments that my health care providers think are
best for me.
___Additional information:_____________________________________
Page 2 of 5
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Part III.  Other Wishes
4.  Expiration Date
___If you want to limit the duration of this AMD provide an expiration
date_____
5.  Military Benefits
__If I am a member of the armed services, the medical choices made by my
agent or any health care provider shall take into consideration the completion of
all procedures necessary to obtain potential medical and/or retirement benefits.
6.  Pregnancy
__If I am pregnant my AMD is null and void___unchanged___or
modified___, if modified list those changes _____________________________
7.  Conflict
___If a conflict arises between my Durable Power of Attorney and my Liv-
ing Will, I want the health care providers to rely on my Living Will ___Durable
Power of Attorney___
8.  Organ Donation
___I do not wish to donate any of my organs or tissues.
___I want to donate all of my organs and tissues.
___I want to donate only these organs and tissues.
____________________________________________________________
9.  Autopsy 
___I do not want an autopsy.
___I agree to an autopsy if my doctors or family wish it.
___Additional information. 
____________________________________________________________
Page 3 of 5
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10.  Witness Statement
I, declare under penalty of perjury; (1) that the individual who signed or
acknowledged this military advance medical directive is personally known to me,
or that the individual’s identity was proven to me by convincing evidence; (2) that
the individual signed or acknowledged this military advance medical directive in
my presence; (3) that the individual appears to be of sound mind and under no
duress, fraud or undue influence; (4) that I am not a person appointed as agent by
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Part V.  Revocation
___I understand that I may revoke this military advance medical directive at
any time.
Page 5 of 5
